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II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues on appeal are: 
(1) Did the District Court err when it enforced an oral 
settlement agreement based on the uncontroverted facts before it? 
(2) If a party by word and conduct consents to a 
settlement agreement, is that settlement agreement void because 
that party had unexpressed reservations? 
(3) Must a District Court hold an evidentiary hearing in 
determining whether to compel a settlement when there are no 
conflicting facts in the submitted affidavits? 
(4) Did the District Court err in denying Appellants' 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel where Respondent's law firm had 
ceased representing Appellants more than six months prior to the 
execution of the guarantees on which this suit is based and there 
was no other relationship between the representation and the 
issues of this case? 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Zions First National Bank ("Zions") filed its Complaint 
suing Barbara Jensen Interiors to recover on a promissory note and 
suing Lowell and Barbara Jensen individually on Continuing 
Guarantees of Credit which they had signed. As defense to that 
action, Appellants contend that their individual Continuing 
Guarantees were released when they paid off a prior loan with 
Zions and dispute the facts surrounding their execution of new 
Continuing Guaranties. Appellants also counterclaimed against 
Zions alleging breach of oral promises to extend credit to 
Appellants and for wrongfully recording in January 1984 a trust 
deed given by Appellants. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Zions filed its Complaint on June 3, 1986. The Court 
scheduled the trial to begin on March 18, 1987. On February 10, 
1988, the parties entered into an oral settlement agreement and 
cancelled the trial date. Shortly thereafter, Zions1 counsel 
submitted to Appellants a written settlement agreement. 
Appellants did not respond to that draft in any way for two 
months, whereupon Zions filed a Motion to Compel Settlement. 
Thereafter, Appellants opposed that motion and filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Ray, Quinney & Nebeker as Zions1 counsel. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
On July 28, 1987, the trial judge denied Appellants* 
Motion to Disqualify counsel and granted Zions1 Motion to Compel 
Settlement. (Exhibit A; Tr. 228-230.) Appellants filed an 
untimely objection to the form of the Order, arguing as to the 
Order's compelling the settlement agreement that by releasing 
Appellants' claims against "agents" of Zions, the Order 
erroneously released claims against Lee McCullough of-Callister, 
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Duncan & Nebeker, Appellants' former counsel. Appellants' 
objections to the Court's Order were heard on September 28, 1988, 
despite the fact that the Order had been signed. 
On November 23, 1987, the district court entered an 
Amended Order which added a paragraph 4 clarifying that the 
settlement agreement makes no release of any attorneys who have 
represented Appellants. (Exhibit B; Tr. 239-241.) 
D. RELEVANT FACTS. 
1. Zions' original Complaint was filed June 3, 1986. 
(Tr. 2-8.) 
2. On October 20, 1986, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker ("RQ&N") 
was substituted as trial counsel for Zions. (Tr. 38-40.) 
3. On January 20, 1987, pursuant to a Motion to Compel, 
the Court ordered Appellants to answer Ziohs' outstanding 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents not later 
than January 30, 1987. The Court also ordered the Jensens to 
submit themselves for depositions on February 10 and 11, 1987. 
Because of Appellants' delays, the Court awarded Zions $200.00 
under Rule 37. The trial date of March 18, 1987 was not 
disturbed. (Tr. 109-110.) 
4. Zions properly noticed the depositions of each of the 
Appellants for February 10, 1987 at the offices of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker. (Tr. 102-103, 104-105, 106-108.) 
5. The Jensens arrived for the depositions on 
February 10, 1987 but then requested time before beginning the 
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depositions to consult with their attorney. Following their 
consultation, Lowell N. Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen, together 
with their attorney, Jeffrey B. Brown, met with Donald M. Bennett 
of Zions and Zions* counsel, James S. Jardine and John A. Adams, 
to discuss settlement. (Affidavit of Donald M. Bennett, 1Hf 6-9; 
Exhibit C; Tr. 168.) 
6. At the conclusion of these negotiations, the parties 
agreed to settle their dispute on specific terms. James S. 
Jardine summarized and repeated the material terms of the 
Settlement Agreement before the meeting concluded and each side 
agreed to the terms stated. (Affidavit of Donald M. Bennett, 
IHflO, 14-15; Exhibit C; Tr. 168-170.) 
7. It was agreed by both sides that Zions1 counsel would 
draft the Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Waiver 
Agreement and Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement. 
(Exhibit D; Tr. 145-163. Affidavit of Donald M. Bennett, If 13; 
Tr. 170.) By cover letter dated February 18, 1987, James S. 
Jardine had copies of the draft settlement papers mailed to 
Jeffrey B. Brown. (Tr. 165.) 
8. In their Affidavit filed in opposition to the Motion 
to Compel Settlement, Appellants do not assert that they made any 
statement or took any action at the February 10, 1987 settlement 
discussions to indicate they were not agreeing to settle the 
case. Rather, they assert only that they "believed no firm 
settlement was reached." (Affidavit of Lowell Jensen, Barbara 
Jensen, and Barbara Jensen Interiors, 1f 4; Tr. 184.) 
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9. Based upon the oral settlement agreement reached by 
the parties, Mr. Jardine notified the District Court on 
February 10, 1987 of the settlement agreement so that the 
pending trial date could be vacated. 
10. Between February 18, and the first of April 1987, 
counsel for Zions wrote to and called Appellants* counsel asking 
for some response to the written settlement draft. No response 
was received. (Tr. 141.) 
11. On April 13, 1988, Zions filed a Motion to Compel 
Settlement and Affidavit of Donald M. Bennett. (Tr. 136-137, 
167-171.) 
12. On May 20, 1988, one day before the scheduled 
hearing on the Motion to Compel Settlement, Appellants filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel and a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Compel Settlement. (Tr. 177-182, 197-198.) 
13. Stephen H. Anderson, formerly a member of the law 
firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker ("RQScN"), represented the 
Appellants in several matters in the years 1979 through December 
1983. In 1983, Mr. Anderson represented Appellants in a buy-back 
of Barbara Jensen Interiors Associates and, in that connection, 
Mr. Anderson represented the Appellants in certain discussions 
with officers of Zions Bank, which included the substitution of 
collateral for an ongoing loan which Appellants had with Zions and 
the pay-back schedule of that loan. (Affidavit of Stephen H. 
Anderson, fflf 3, 4; Tr. 214-215.) 
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14. Mr. Anderson does not recall nor do his files 
reflect his ever discussing with Appellants, with Zions or with 
other RQ&N attorneys, then-existing Continuing Guarantees of 
Credit which the Appellants signed or the circumstances under 
which they would be cancelled. (Affidavit of Stephen H. Anderson, 
1f 4; Tr. 214-215.) 
15. The last legal work performed by Mr. Anderson for 
Appellants was in October 1983 and the last bill was sent in 
December 1983. (Affidavit of Stephen H. Anderson, Iflf 4, 5; Tr. 
214-215.) 
16. The Continuing Guarantees of Credit, on which Zions 
sues in this action, were signed by Appellants Lowell and Barbara 
Jensen in July 1984. (Exhibit to Complaint; Tr. 7-8.) 
17. Appellants claim that, despite RQ&N being counsel of 
record since October 1986, they first realized that Mr. Anderson 
had been a member of RQ&N on February 10, 1987, the date on which 
the settlement agreement was negotiated and concluded. However, 
Appellants said nothing at the time and did not file their Motion 
to Disqualify until May 20, 1987. (Tr. 193-196.) 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Zions contends that the trial court correctly granted the 
Motion to Compel Settlement because the uncontroverted evidence 
before it showed that an actual, unambiguous oral settlement 
agreement was reached on February 10, 1987. The affidavits of 
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Appellants create no factual issue because they do not controvert 
Zions' affidavit account of the actions and words spoken by them 
at the settlement negotiations. Rather, Appellants' affidavits 
only assert that Appellants had an unexpressed reservation about 
settlement. Given the uncontroverted words spoken and actions 
taken, and the related actions such as cancelling the trial date, 
the trial judge correctly compelled the settlement without an 
evidentiary hearing. 
The trial court also correctly denied Appellants' Motion 
to Disqualify RQ&N as counsel for Zions. RQ&N's representation of 
Zions was not substantially related to its prior representation of 
Appellants because the guarantees on which Zions sues here were 
executed by Appellants at least seven months after RQ&N ceased its 
representation of Appellants. In addition, the district court 
also correctly ruled that Appellants' Motion was untimely since it 
was filed seven months after RQ&N entered its appearance in this 
case. 
V. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN COMPELLING THE SETTLEMENT 
ON THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS BEFORE THE COURT WHICH REFLECTED 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
a. The Trial Judge's Decision Should Not Be Set Aside 
Unless It Was An Abuse of Discretion. 
In Utah a trial court has the discretion to summarily 
enforce settlement agreements entered into by litigants while 
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litigation is pending before it. See Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 1982); Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 608 (Utah 1972). It was pursuant to 
this discretionary authority that the court in the underlying 
action granted Zions' Motion to Compel Settlement. That decision 
can be upset on appeal only if it is shown that the trial court 
abused its discretion. See Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 
1290 (Utah 1976). The burden of establishing such an abuse is on 
the Appellants, Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp., 404 P.2d 30, 
33 n.9 (Utah 1965), and a strong showing it reguired that the 
courts exercise of discretion was "manifestly unreasonable, or 
exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." 
Himango v. Prime Time Broadcasting, Inc., 680 P.2d 432, 438 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1984); see also Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Honeywell, 
639 P.2d 996, 999 (Alaska 1981). Appellants have not and cannot 
meet that burden. 
b. The Court Had Before It Sufficient Facts to Properly 
Order Specific Enforcement of the Agreement. 
The leading Utah case on judicial enforcement of 
settlement agreements is Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979). In that case, the court 
relied on affidavits submitted by the parties and oral argument of 
their counsel to summarily enforce a settlement agreement. On 
appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by not 
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requiring an evidentiary hearing to determine certain unresolved 
issues of fact. In response, the Supreme Court wrote: 
The critical issue is whether the court had 
before it sufficient facts to properly order 
specific enforcement according to the terms of 
the agreement. 
Id. at 608. The Court went on to hold that on the basis of the 
facts before it no evidentiary hearing was required. X^- at 608. 
Travelstead establishes that an evidentiary hearing is 
not required when there is no real dispute as to the facts or when 
the factual issues are not complex. This holding was later 
reemphasized by the Supreme Court in Robinson v. State of Utah, 
620 P.2d 519, 520 (Utah 1980) and is supported by case law from 
other jurisdictions. See e.g., U. S. v. Newport News Shipping & 
Dry Dock Co., 571 F.2d 1283, 1286 (4th Cir. 1978); Meetings & 
Expositions Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2nd Cir. 1973). 
(i) There Was No Factual Conflict in the Affidavits 
Before the Lower Court. 
The lower court here correctly determined not to 
hold an evidentiary hearing because there were no controverted 
facts in the affidavits and because the issue was not otherwise 
complex. The question presented to the district court was whether 
the parties had reached an oral settlement agreement on 
February 10, 1987. Zions submitted the Affidavit of Donald M. 
Bennett, who reported the events and statements made at the 
settlement meeting, including the terms of the settlement repeated 
and agreed to by the parties. (Tr. 167-182.) Appell.ants 
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submitted in opposition the Affidavit of Lowell Jensen, Barbara 
Jensen and Barbara Jensen Interiors (hereinafter "Jensen 
Affidavit"). (Tr. 183-187.) However, the Jensen Affidavit 
nowhere contradicts Mr. Bennett's account of the settlement 
meeting or the statements made in that meeting agreeing to the 
settlement. Rather, the Jensen Affidavit only asserts that the 
Jensens had a different intent or understanding than they 
expressed in the meeting. The affidavit also suggests that the 
Jensens changed their minds about settlement, a change not 
specifically communicated to Zions for over 60 days after the 
settlement. 
The trial judge thus concluded that the evidence of the 
verbal settlement agreement was not contradicted. He also 
concluded that a written agreement was not a condition of 
settlement but merely a memorialization thereof, and that the 
cancellation by the parties of the depositions and the trial was 
extrinsic evidence of such actual agreement, as was Appellants' 
failure to communicate any disagreement with the settlement for 
over two months. 
(ii) An Oral Agreement Whose Terms Are Unambiguously 
Expressed Is Not Defeated Because One Party 
Has An Unexpressed Differing Intent. 
Appellants contend that they are not bound by the 
settlement agreement because there was never a "meeting of the 
minds", arguing in essence that the Jensens had a different intent 
or understanding than they expressed in the settlement meeting. 
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However, " [i]t is well established in the law that unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract." Jaramillo 
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, even assuming Appellants had undisclosed intentions, by 
manifesting their intent to settle the dispute on specific, 
unambiguous terms, and by assenting to such terms while James S. 
Jardine summarized and repeated those terms to them at the 
conclusion of the negotiations, (Tr. 168-170), the Appellants 
bound themselves to the terms of the settlement agreement. See 
City of Everett v. Estate of Sumstad, 631 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. 
1981). Appellants cannot now rely on unexpressed reservations to 
defeat the existence of the settlement agreement when by their 
words and conduct they reasonably lead Zions to believe the 
agreement had been entered into. See Zeman v. Lufthansa German 
Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Alaska 1985). 
(iii) All of Appellants' Actions Support the 
Existence of an Agreement. 
In addition to the affidavit testimony of what 
transpired in the settlement negotiations, the lower court found 
that the Appellants* subsequent conduct evidenced their intent to 
enter into the settlement agreement. It is a well accepted rule 
of construction that Min determining whether a contract exists and 
what its terms are, [courts] examine the objective manifestations 
of intent, as evidenced by the parties1 communications and acts." 
Real Estate Loan Fund v. Heuner, 709 P.2d 727, 730 (Or. Ct. App. 
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1985). See also, Praggastis v. Sandner, 595 P.2d 520, 524 
(Or. Ct. App. 1979). 
In the court's view, the uncontested facts that the 
Appellants* depositions were cancelled and the court informed of 
settlement supported the conclusion that a settlement agreement 
had been reached. Moreover, the two months that passed after the 
February 10, 1987 settlement meeting without Appellants ever 
indicating any disagreement with settlement also suggests that 
there was a change of mind rather than an absence of original 
agreement. Finally, the Appellants' actions, including their 
delay in responding to the draft settlement agreement, are similar 
to Appellants' earlier failure to respond to discovery and their 
apparent attempts to delay the trial of the case. 
(iv) Settlement Agreements Will Be Enforced Even 
Where the Agreement Was Not Arrived At in the 
Presence of the Court Nor Reduced to Writing. 
The settlement agreement is binding on Appellants 
even though it was not arrived at in the presence of the court and 
it was never reduced to writing. See Kukla v. National Distillers 
Products Company, 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973). The Supreme 
Court made it clear in Travelstead that whether the parties 
negotiated the settlement in private or in the presence of the 
court is immaterial. 592 P.2d at 608. Furthermore, once parties 
orally agree upon the terms of an agreement, a contract exists 
even though one or both of the parties contemplated that the terms 
thereof would be reduced to writing as evidence of the agreement. 
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Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 
1982); Stotilemyre v. Reed, 665 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Wash.Ct.App. 
1983); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 (1979). „ It is 
undisputed that the Jensens agreed at the February 10, 1987 
meeting to settle their dispute on specific terms and that counsel 
for Zions would draft the settlement agreement. (Tr. 168-170.) 
Therefore, the subsequent failure of Appellants to execute the 
written agreement does not act to nullify that oral contract. 
Lawrence Const. Co., 642 P.2d at 384. 
(v) The Question of the Agreement's Release 
of Zions* Former Law Firm, Reflected in the 
Amended Order, Was Not Material Such as 
to Preclude the Agreement. 
Appellants argue in their brief that the fact of 
settlement is contradicted by the dispute over and eventual 
resolution in the Amended Order of the non-waiver by Appellants of 
any claim they might have "against any attorneys who have 
represented [Zions]." Appellants* Brief, pp. 17-18. The 
background of this issue shows the fallacy of Appellants* argument. 
At the settlement discussions on February 10, 1987, part 
of the agreement was that Appellants* claims against Zions and its 
officers would be waived. (Affidavit of Donald M. Bennett, If 10; 
Tr. 169.) No mention at the settlement negotiations was made of 
Zions' usual counsel, Lee McCullough of Callister, Duncan & 
Nebeker ("CD&N"), who had previously also represented Appellants. 
The draft settlement agreement extended its release and waiver of 
claims language to Zions' "agents" without further specification. 
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The Court compelled the settlement and after the Order 
was entered, Appellants submitted an Objection to the form of the 
Order, raising the issue of the apparent or purported release of 
CD&N. Appellants' objections were argued to the Court on 
September 28, 1987. At that hearing and in its response to 
Appellants' Objections, Zions indicated that it did not regard the 
Settlement Agreement's language as extending to or releasing CD&N, 
that it was never intended that it do so, and that Zions was 
willing to reflect that understanding in any appropriate way. 
Thus, at Appellants' request, that understanding was included as 
paragraph 4 in the Amended Order entered by the district court. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, there has never been any 
dispute over whether CD&N was to be released because it was never 
intended by any party that CD&N be released. Moreover, while 
Zions did not think that the original language of the written 
Settlement Agreement effected such a release, Zions has at all 
times been willing to change the written agreement's language to 
more clearly reflect the understanding of the parties. 
Thus, Appellants' argument on this point is wrong for 
three reasons. First, there was no dispute on this term between 
the parties in the oral agreement. Second, the language in the 
draft written agreement did not create a dispute on its face, and 
did not undermine the effectiveness of the oral settlement 
agreement. Third, Zions' willingness at all times to clarify or 
amend the written agreement to reflect the parties' understanding 
reflects the lack of real dispute on this point. 
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c. The Trial Court Has the Inherent Power to Enforce 
the Settlement Agreement Entered into Between the 
Parties. 
It is well settled that a trial court possesses inherent 
power to summarily enforce a settlement agreement entered into by 
litigants while an action is pending before the court. 
Tracy-Collins and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(Utah 1979); Miller v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 1982); 
Kukla v. National Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th 
Cir. 1973); Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Forman, 469 
F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1972). Because both the law and public 
policy favor the resolution of disputes without litigation, 
settlement agreements are to be upheld whenever possible. 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 592 P.2d at 607; Echols v. Nimmo, 
586 F. Supp. 467, 468-69 (W.D. Mich. 1984). 
Thus, the order here was clearly within the district 
court's power. For the reasons set forth above, the order was 
proper because the extrinsic terms were clearly unambiguous, and 
the parties relied upon them. 
II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY BECAUSE THE PRIOR REPRESENTATION 
WAS UNRELATED TO THIS LITIGATION. 
As more fully set forth below, the trial judge's denial 
of the Motion to Disqualify was correct because Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker ("RQ&N") does not presently represent any of the 
Appellants and because RQ&N's prior representation of defendants 
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was not related to the issues in this suit. Indeed, the 
Continuing Guarantees of Credit which are at issue in this case 
were signed by Appellants more than seven months after the last 
legal work performed for them by Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. In 
addition, Appellants were on notice of RQ&N's representation of 
Zions beginning October 20, 1986, but failed until May 20, 
1987, l on the eve of a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
Settlement, to raise the issue of a purported conflict, which 
delay rendered untimely Appellants' Motion. 
a. There Are No Circumstances Which Would Give Rise 
to Disqualification of Plaintiff's Counsel. 
In Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court defined the grounds upon which 
a law firm would be disqualified for violation of the canons of 
ethics. Under its teaching, there is no basis for disqualifica-
tion in this case. In Margulies, the Court noted that the test 
for disqualification is whether there was a "substantial 
relationship" between the prior representation and the issues of 
the present case. Id. at 1202. As noted above, RQ&N finished its 
actual representation of Appellants in October 1983 and sent its 
*On or about April 7, 1986, counsel for Defendants mentioned 
to Zions' counsel in a phone call the prior representation of 
Defendants by Mr. Anderson, and by letter dated April 15, 1987, 
sent a copy of a 1983 letter to Zions signed by Mr. Anderson on 
behalf of Defendants. However, Defendants did not assert an 
actual conflict existed in those communications, but only made 
inquiry as to whether a conflict might exist. 
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last bill in December 1983. The Continuing Guarantees on which 
Zions has sued the Appellants were signed in July 1984.2 In 
addition, Defendants' counterclaim involves events after December 
1983 as to which RQ&N had no involvement on behalf of Appellants. 
Thre is thus no substantial relationship between this 
case and the prior representation. Moreover, the gap in time 
demonstrates the lack of a "substantial relation" between RQ&N's 
representation of Defendants and the issues of this suit. 
Appellants present no evidence, nor is it evident on the 
pleadings, that RQ&N in its prior representation of Defendants 
could, let alone did, obtain confidential information regarding 
matters relating to the issues of this action. 
For these reasons, there is no relationship between the 
issues in this case and RQ&N's past representation of Appellants. 
b. Defendants' Motion Was Untimely. 
Because motions to disqualify opposing counsel are 
sometimes used as a tool to harass and delay the opposition, such 
motions must be filed at the onset of litigation, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc. v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 242, 257 
2The Appellants assert in their Affidavit that Mr. Anderson 
had done some work on their sale of property from which proceeds 
went to Zions, and that those proceeds were "to have released the 
continuing guaranties upon which Zions now brings suit." (Jensen 
Affidavit, 1f 7; Tr. 185.) However, the facts belie that 
assertion, since the continuing guaranties on which Zions sues 
here were signed in July 1984, and Mr. Anderson could not have 
been present for any discussion on their potential release 
inasmuch as his representations had ended some nine months earlier 
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(D.D.C. 1965), or with promptness once the facts upon which a 
motion to disqualify is based become known, Milone v. English, 
306 F.2d 814, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The failure promptly to so 
act has been held to warrant the denial of the motion. See United 
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 320 (N.M. 1980) 
and cases cited therein. 
The case most often cited for this rule, Redd v. Shell 
Oil Co., 578 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975), illustrates that the 
Appellants1 motion was not timely. In Redd, the Court of Appeals 
held that a motion to disqualify was untimely where it was not 
filed until the Friday afternoon before a Monday trial, although 
the information upon which the motion was based had been known for 
five months. In this case, RQ&N had been counsel of record for 
seven months and by their own admission Appellants knew of the 
purported conflict prior to the settlement discussions and more 
than 60 days prior to filing the Motion to Disqualify, which was 
filed one day prior to the hearing on Zions' Motion to Enforce 
Settlement. Under those circumstances, Appellants' motion was 
clearly untimely. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted Zions* Motion to Compel 
Settlement. The uncontroverted evidence shows that an unambiguous 
oral settlement agreement was reached on February 10, 1987. 
Appellants' affidavits do not contradict that fact nor do they 
create any factual issues regarding whether settlement was 
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reached. The trial court also correctly denied Appellants' Motion 
to Disqualify Zions1 counsel. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker1s 
representation of Appellants ceased six months prior to the 
execution of th§ guaranties upon which the original action was 
based and was therefore not substantially related to its 
representation of zions. Furthermore, Appellants' motion was 
untimely since it was filed seven months after Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker entered its appearance. Therefore, Zions respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the District Court's Order which 
granted Zions' Motion to Compel Settlement and which denied 
Appellants' Motion to Disqualify Counsel. 
DATED this day of July, 1988. 
RAY, QV/NNHY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Rick L. Rose 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the jj_ day of July, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the Respondent was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Charles C. Brown 
Jeffrey B. Brown 
City Center I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
2039J 
COL^C-y^ 
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' c ^ C L E R K ' S OFFICE Salt Lake County Utah 
JUL 2 8 1987 
JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and 
JOHN A. ADAMS (A0023) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Zions 
First National Bank 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a national association, 
Plaintiff, 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, 
INC. and LOWELL N. JENSEN 
and BARBARA W. JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL AND 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLEMENT 
Civil No. C-86-4044 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
ooOoo 
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Settlement came on for hearing before the Court 
on July 6, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by James S. Jardine; 
defendants were represented by Charles S. Brown. Based upon the 
memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and the presenta-
tions of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Counsel is denied. 
The Motion to Disqualify was filed nearly seven months after Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker entered an appearance as counsel in this case, 
two months after the scheduled trial date and three months after 
settlement in this case. The motion was not timely. In addition, 
the Affidavit of Stephen H. Anderson and plaintiff's memorandum 
indicate that Ray, Quinney & Nebeker does not presently represent 
any of the defendants and that its prior representation of the 
defendants was not related to the guarantees on which plaintiff is 
suing in this case. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Settlement is granted. 
Based upon the affidavits and memorandua filed, the Court finds 
that the parties agreed on February 10, 1987, to a settlement of 
the issues and disputes reflected in the above-referenced lawsuit 
on the terms set forth in Exhibits HAM through "C" to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Settlement. The Court 
further finds that the fact of this agreement is reflected and 
confirmed by the parties' cancellation of the depositions 
scheduled for February 10 and 11, 1987, and the stricking of the 
trial date of March 15, 1987, in reliance on the agreement of 
settlement. 
3. Pursuant to the Court's granting of Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Settlement, the Settlement Agreement attached as 
Exhibit "AH to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Settlement shall be deemed signed by defendants as of the 
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date of this Order, the Mutual Release and Waiver Agreement 
attached as Exhibit "B" to the Memorandum shall be deemed signed 
by defendants and plaintiff as of the date of this Order, and the 
Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement attached as Exhibit 
MCM shall be deemed signed by the defendants thereto as of the 
date of this Order, with the accrued interest amount to be 
determined by plaintiff, filled in on said Judgment and filed with 
the Court and opposing counsel within 10 days of the date of this 
Order• 
DATED thisc2iL daY of July, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved As To Form: 
Raymond S. Uno _ _ - -
D i s t r i c t Judge A T T r - b t 
H DIXON H!NPLE> 
Charles C. Brown 
Attorney for Defendants 
1700j 
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Charles C. Brown (1446) 
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457) 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-5656 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : 
a national association, 
: AMENDED ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC, 
and LOWELL N. JENSEN and : Civil No, C-86-4044 
BARBARA W. JENSEN, 
: Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Defendant's Objections to this Court's Order Denying 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Granting Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Settlement, dated July 28, 1987, came on for hearing before 
the court on September 28, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by 
James S. Jardine and defendants were represented by Charles C. 
Brown. Based upon the memoranda filed by the parties and the 
presentations of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
HEREBY ORDERED and .;r:Jet - ^  
Jt'ttrnijaii' ~ +r> Disqualify Counsel \r- denied. 
The M^ti ** risquality was 'llt-d nr- j\ ,*r - T,t!v aftp: '^y, 
i I in i in i in i in i i » , 
two moot;. ij?f : i :<e si:heOa.tj. ii hi. t -M .: i * M - 1 - - n' ru- artei 
settlemer- - - •- -<*- l} * ) •-• ' ^ , f " : o n , 
1 
indicate i* K/r . r^u^ ••% Nebeker does represent 
any of ** defendants •* *? • .ooresentat ui tut 
defendant wa^ nnf rp., .. - \ . ..i.antees v,r. v. ,.;: , 'ainfif Is 
suing in this case. 
2. P J {. 
Based up r :.< - and Memoranda \*~ v.« ... i 
that the i rties agreed • * .ai*« ••  •' sett 'err-ent 
-t • • Exhibh * ' • *(. iqr. : defendan 
Memorandum! in Support of Motion to Compel Settlement, hp - M»t 
I II II I I I i I 111 i i l I I l l l l l l ,' „ ' u i i H H I H H i I I «,, 1 f ' " I I { 
confirmed - * *.v parties' cancellaticr. ^t * depositions 
scheduler - February fcri^ ' - ne 
,reemenT 
settlement . 
Pursuant u nie C U U I L idau: 
Motion to Jompel Settlement *-^ e ?.. ^ment Agreement attached as 
Exhibit Memorandum i Suppoit c' Plaintiff's Motion to 
-2 - ' 
Compel Settlement shall be deemed signed by defendants as of the 
date I f" < i* » •'» M-'UH 1 RPIP^*- n^> i ^ v^r Agreement 
• d 
:etenai - * * — . . « , late <t this Orde 
Judgment by Confess]or &rA vor-.fieri Statement attached as Fv»ibit 
deemed signea ifendants thereto a^ r p 
date : t i- . •- : ie • « -* nterest amomt T 
the , 
Orde e>M- defendants shall be SOL.:: 
1987, 
standin« * iguage documents 
release any * rs : lefendai against any attorneys 
represented pIn i nt iff 
DATE11 «' I' \ \ l"""J 
BI rHE coi IF r; 
No i P** ^ ** 
of October., 1 98 7 
APPROVED: 
IV 
Raymond S. Uno 
District Court Jud g e 
I A !,'*<"' 
$£££ 
JamfePs S. Jardi 
RAJ, QUINNEY/yNEBEKER 
Attorneys fop/piaintiff 
Zions First National Bank 
2786j 
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JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and 
JOHN A, ADAMS (A0023) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Zions 
First National Bank 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a national association, 
Plaintiff, 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, 
INC. and LOWELL N. JENSEN 
and BARBARA W JENSEN, 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD M. 
BENNETT 
'("" mi mi II II il , ; 
Judge Raymonc 
D o n a J mi II II I, II "i i,"111 in«,' 1 ( 1 i I in in i in ( II i i i in < 11 in II ] :>i (> ( i m n I  i > ( < i> i-> <'" :"; 111(1 
states as follows: . 
j.. d resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
? .vo personal knowledge 
this Affidavit. 
3 . II III) IV I III I 1 II1 I 1()| I II I I'm1 I III 11 1 Z * U H d J . D d i m 
("Zionfi" I in excess ul twenty (20) years. 
< second vice president in 
Zions* Credit Management Group. 
5 Sometime after the account :i <i Jensen 
' ' Ii ons \ iei 11 :i i 11o defa dauuin was 
assigned to me : handling. 
( > IM?1, i'lHi, i
 W)i<, present the if, *•- i 
Ray, in I,I I I I I i 
depositions * \*-ir t --ai a Jensen Interiors, Inc.# I,L^^ Jec.bc, 
iii I 111i.i irIn"- -. W. Jensen (referred to collectively herein as the 
"Jensens ) 
deposit j r «. * i >u ; *- r scheduled because 
jiibuxt wiLu Lueir attorney about 
the possibi ] i ty of se111ernent. 
Aft ,er a delay of approximately one he ur, Lowell N 
conference r o o m w i t: 1 i 
their attorney, Jeffeiy l< " ana stated that they desirea 
discus?; ii possible settlement Zions' claims against - ** Jensens 
instead < !' .: and 
negotiations began. 
James Tardine and John A Ailanis nl thv law firm of 
Ray, Quinney anu - "«11 <i <« < ' 
settlement discussions. 
After °riod of discussion fhat exceeded oi le 1 i' : ur , 
during wh. . ,.„. ;• = ] 
consulted privately wi»r- >a^  another, Zions ^ ensens agreed 
*
 v J
 -- \g terms: 
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{-'i) The;1 Jensens agreed t-n siqn p judgment by 
c o II f e s s i o n in I 111i R HI I I I I I II I I I o I $ 11 i , <-i 011 01 - i n c i p a 1, p l u s 
i n t e r e - i i in i I I 11 I Ii i II i i I i I t i n I 
settlement agreement, and cause the same * - T. t-* -.--M. 
t h e C ] e r k o f 1 : l \ < * r h i i r! „i u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t " 
Lake County witi lavs of the e i a 
settlement agreement. 
( - L ui nave 
docketed the judgment by confession r ^nnnHes 
of its choosing. 
upen . t- 4dii..*t Hit- judgment , confessii 
L w J - -*1* entry ldgment. 
e Jei lsei is i; ;i :i t l i:i i I 
the execut < < - *.• settlement agreement paid Zions 
f i I 1 ] principal amounI: of $6] 600 , Z:i ons agreed * n r m
 v e 
bo11 it 11 prejudgment ai Id f • c stji ;ic:lgi nei 11 
with the judgment. 
* V - ie Jensens within 120 days 
o t t - . i,:ecutio . settlement
 a g r e e m e n t p a i C| ] e s s 
than amount owed under "i judgment, 
%rments result in a 10% 
for each dollar eived. For example i 
paid, Zions would apply a credit of $1,100.00 to Jensens 1 
• 3 
(f) Jensens agree? * ovide ? certify 
personal uernent, 
execution •* t ra settlement agreement. 
( Jensens agreed - * *ransfe* * * < 
be transtei ^ v personal assets win 
an amount greate * *, - $ by any mean < ••..*• t 
I 
Zions . i
 t roposec Jiu.u iisposi wrt:ty. 
(h) Zions and the Jensens agreed t execute? a 
n . 
(i ) Each side agreed to bear i ts own, attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
11. I 
settlement agreement entered into by Zions ai id the Jensens. 
] ± observed other persons in the room also taking 
13. }i wa: agreed that tht ^ r" f ~ Quinney & 
**•'.*-'* b memorializing trie terms of 
,* oc:i.i.lenient agreement entei^d into. 
14. Before the end of the Jardine repeated 
e111emP t agreement 
entered into. 
15. agreed to the terms of the settlement agreement on 
t 
each of the plaintiffs agree to the terms of the settlement 
agreement. 
DATED this /£?,l? day of April, 1987. 
Donald M. Bennett 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
On the /O^^ day of April, 1987, personally appeared 
before me Donald M. Bennett, known by me to be the signer of the 
foregoing document, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
^Z<^L^>v C^A, 
Notary Public ~7/ 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
1127A 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
WHEREAS, Zions First National Bank, a national 
association ("Zions"), has filed an action, Civil No. C-86-4044, 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County against 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. ("BJI"), a Utah corporation; 
Lowell N. Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen, individuals (collectively 
referred to herein as the "Jensens"); 
WHEREAS, BJI and Jensens answered the above-referenced 
action and filed a Counterclaim; 
WHEREAS, the parties to the above-referenced action now 
desire to resolve their differences and dispute by entering into 
this Settlement Agreement; 
WHEREAS, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
promises of the parties hereto to perform the duties and to be 
bound by the rights and obligations described below, 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED: 
1. BJI and Jensens simultaneous with the execution 
of this Settlement Agreement, will execute the Judgment by 
Confession, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", 
and cause the same together with a proposed Judgment to be filed 
with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County within five (5) days of the date of execution of this 
Settlement Agreement. 
2. Zions shall have the right to register, file or have 
docketed said Judgment by Confession and/or any accompanying 
Judgment in any other county(ies) of its choosing. 
3. Zions agrees not to take any action to execute upon 
or collect against said Judgment by Confession and/or accompanying 
Judgment until 120 days after entry of said Judgment by Confession 
and/or accompanying Judgment* 
4. In the event that BJI and/or Jensens within sixty 
(60) days of the execution of this Settlement Agreement pay Zions 
the full principal amount ($61,600.00) stated in said Judgment by 
Confession and/or accompanying Judgment, Zions will forgive both 
the pre-judgment and post-judgment interest associated with said 
Judgment by Confession and/or accompanying Judgment. 
5. In the event that BJI and/or Jensens pay within 120 
days of execution of this Settlement Agreement less than the full 
amount owed to Zions (i.e., principal, pre-judgment interest and 
accruing post-judgment interest) under said Judgment by Confession 
and/or accompanying Judgment, any such cash payments will result 
in a credit of 110% for each dollar received. For example, if 
$1,000.00 were paid, a credit of $1,100.00 would be given by Zions 
to the outstanding balance of BJI and the Jensens. 
6. BJI and Jensens will provide to Zions certified 
personal financial statements within fifteen (15) days of 
execution of this Settlement Agreement. 
7. The Jensens will not transfer, cause to be 
transferred or allow to be transferred any personal assets with a 
value or in an amount greater than $2,500.00 by any means, be it 
by gift, sale or otherwise, or allow any personal assets to be 
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pledged, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, without first 
providing advance written notice of at least ten (10) days to 
Zions of the proposed transfer, sale, gift, pledge or encumbrance, 
8. Zions, on the one hand, and BJI and the Jensens, on 
the other hand, will execute simultaneously with the execution of 
this Settlement Agreement, the accompanying Mutual Release and 
Waiver Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
9. All parties will bear their own attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC. 
a national association 
By: By: 
Its: Its: 
Lowell N. Jensen, an individual 
Barbara W. Jensen, an Individual 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987, personally appeared 
before me of Zions First National Bank known 
by me to be a signer of the foregoing Settlement Agreement who 
duly acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Settlement 
Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and voluntarily 
signed the same on behalf of and with authority from Zions First 
National Bank. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me of Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc. known by me to be a signer of the foregoing Settlement 
Agreement who duly acknowledged to me that (s)he has read the 
foregoing Settlement Agreement, knows and understands its 
contents, and voluntarily signed the same on behalf of and with 
authority from Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Lowell N. Jensen known by me to be a signer of the 
foregoing Settlement Agreement who duly acknowledged to me that he 
has read the foregoing Settlement Agreement, knows and understands 
its contents and voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Barbara W. Jensen known by me to be a signer of the 
foregoing Settlement Agreement who duly acknowledged to me that 
she has read the foregoing Settlement Agreement, knows and 
understands its contents and voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
1072A 
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MUTUAL RELEASE AND WAIVER AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into as of this day of 
February, 1987, by and between Zions First National Bank, a 
national association (a>ZionsM) and the following parties (referred 
to hereinafter individually and collectively as the "Jensens"): 
a. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
b. Lowell N. Jensen 
c. Barbara W. Jensen 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Zions and the Jensens executed that Settlement 
Agreement dated February , 1987 (the "Settlement Agreement"); and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement, certain releases and waivers of claims are to be 
accomplished in connection with certain compromises and settlement 
arrangements relating to indebtedness of Jensens to Zions; and 
WHEREAS, in connection with this Agreement, the 
documentation of the compromises and settlement arrangements 
related to the aforesaid indebtedness is being completed: 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of 
the mutual covenants, promises and agreements herein contained, it 
is hereby agreed as follows: 
1. Release and Waiver by Jensens. Jensens and each of 
them, jointly and severally, do hereby waive, release, relinquish 
and forever disavow any and all claims, interests, rights, 
remedies, and causes of action assertable, directly or indirectly 
against Zions or any of its agents, employees, officers, advisers, 
directors or consultants (whether or not any of the same were 
acting within or without the scope of their employment, agency or 
engagement with Zions) for any acts, actions, failures to act, 
representations, commitments, statements, warranties, failures to 
disclose or make representations, covenants, promises or 
agreements, taken, arising out of or in connection with (directly 
or indirectly) or otherwise contemplated or associated in any way 
with the lending transactions which are the subject of the 
Settlement Agreement and which are described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein. The waiver, release, 
relinquishment and disavowal herein made shall be construed 
broadly in favor of Zions, its agents, employees, officers, 
advisers, directors and consultants, and any ambiguity, doubt or 
question as to applicability of the same shall be resolved in all 
events in favor of waiver, release, relinquishment and disavowal• 
Jensens agree that the waivers, releases, relinquishments and 
disavowals herein granted shall be with respect to claims, 
interests, rights, remedies and causes of action known or unknown, 
matured or unmatured, contingent or direct, existing or hereafter 
arising. Jensens1 agreements herein are made without reliance 
upon any warranty, representation or statement of Zions with 
respect to any of the matters herein, except and to the extent set 
forth in the Settlement Agreement and in documentation which is 
executed in connection therewith. 
As part and parcel of this Agreement, Jensens agree not 
to initiate any actions, court proceedings, arbitration, 
administrative agency actions or otherwise with respect to any 
of the matters waived, released and relinquished hereunder. 
Jensens hereby affirm, acknowledge and agree that Zions is 
fully discharged of performance under the terms of all of the 
agreements, documents, instruments and contracts (oral or written) 
associated with any of the transactions listed on Exhibit "A" 
and is fully discharged of performance under the same except and 
to the extent that obligations are continuing under the said 
transactions after the date hereof. 
2. Jensens Fully Advised. Jensens and each of them do, 
by their respective signatures hereto, warrant and represent that 
they have been fully advised (to the extent that they have each 
deemed prudent and necessary) by competent legal counsel and other 
advisers of the nature and extent of this Agreement and, 
notwithstanding the fact of the potential for the waiver and 
release of valuable rights, remedies, claims and causes of action 
(and the consequential potential for sustaining unremedied losses 
and damages by reason of this Agreement), do hereby express and 
agree that this Agreement is entered voluntarily and intentionally 
and without reservation, and that no fraud, coercion or duress of 
any kind has been employed in connection with the same. 
3. Adecruate and Valuable Consideration to Jensens. 
Jensens and each of them do hereby acknowledge and agree, further, 
that good and valuable consideration has been given for the 
covenants and agreements set forth herein, the same being in the 
form of the compromises and settlement arrangements with respect 
to their indebtedness to Zions (including the discharges and 
releases hereinafter described) and benefits obtained in 
connection with the Settlement Agreement. 
4. Prospective Inapplicability. Zions agrees that 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to be a waiver 
of claims, rights, interests, remedies or causes of action 
which arise as the result of acts, inactions, representations. 
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warranties, agreements or covenants which have their origin on a 
date subsequent to the date of this Agreement. 
5. Waiver and Release of Claims by Zions. In accordance 
with the provisions therefor in the Settlement Agreement, Zions 
does hereby waive, release, relinquish and forever disavow any and 
all claims, interests, rights, remedies, and causes of action 
assertable, directly or indirectly against one or more of the 
Jensens for any acts, actions, failures to act, representations, 
commitments, statements, warranties, failures to disclose or make 
representations, covenants, promises or agreements, taken, arising 
out of or in connection with (directly or indirectly) or otherwise 
contemplated or associated in any way with the lending 
transactions which are the subject of the Settlement Agreement and 
which are described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein except for that certain Small Business 
Administration Loan No. GP 339, 418-2006-SLC, dated September 3, 
1980. The waiver, release, relinquishment and disavowal herein 
made except for said Small Business Administration Loan shall be 
construed broadly in favor of the Jensens, and any ambiguity, 
doubt or question as to applicability of the same shall be 
resolved in all events in favor of waiver, release, relinquishment 
and disavowal. Zions agrees that the waivers, releases, 
relinquishments and disavowals herein granted shall be with 
respect to claims, interests, rights, remedies and causes of 
action known or unknown, matured or unmatured, contingent or 
direct, existing or hereafter arising. Zions1 agreements herein 
are made without reliance upon any warranty, representation or 
statement of the Jensens with respect to any of the matters 
herein, except and to the extent set forth in the Settlement 
Agreement and in documentation which is executed in connection 
therewith. 
As part and parcel of this Agreement, Zions agrees not to 
initiate any actions, court proceedings, arbitration, 
administrative agency actions or otherwise with respect to any of 
the matters waived, released and relinquished hereunder. Zions 
hereby affirms, acknowledges and agrees that Jensens are fully 
discharged of performance under the terms of all of the 
agreements, documents, instruments and contracts (oral or written) 
associated with any of the transactions listed on Exhibit "A" and 
is fully discharged of performance under the same except for said 
Small Business Administration Loan. 
6. Zions Fully Advised. Zions, by its signatures 
hereto, warrants and represents, that it has been fully advised 
(to the extent that it has deemed prudent and necessary) by 
competent legal counsel and other advisers of the nature and 
extent of this Agreement and, notwithstanding the fact of the 
potential for the waiver and release of valuable rights, remedies, 
claims and causes of action (and the consequential potential for 
sustaining unremedied losses and damages by reason of this 
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Agreement), does hereby express and agree that this Agreement is 
entered voluntarily and intentionally and without reservation, and 
that no fraud, coercion or duress of any kind has been employed in 
connection with the same. 
7. Adequate and Valuable Consideration to Zions. Zions 
does hereby acknowledge and agree, further, that good and valuable 
consideration has been given for the covenants and agreements set 
forth herein, the same being in the form of the compromises and 
settlement arrangements with respect to the Jensens' obligations 
to Zions and benefits obtained in connection with the Settlement 
Agreement• 
8. Prospective Inapplicability. Jensens agree that 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to be a waiver of 
claims, rights, interests, remedies or causes of action which 
arise as the result of acts, inactions, representations, 
warranties, agreements or covenants which have their origin 
on a date subsequent to the date of this Agreement. 
9. Miscellaneous. This Agreement shall be governed by 
and subject to the terms, requirements and obligations of the 
Settlement Agreement and the documents executed in connection 
therewith. This Agreement is entered into and shall be governed 
by the laws of the State of Utah. The terms and provisions hereof 
are intended to be severable and divisible, the beneficial terms 
and provisions of the same, to survive any invalidation of other 
terms or provisions. Time is of the essence hereof. No waiver of 
any of the rights and remedies hereunder or amendment of the terms 
of this Agreement shall be valid or binding unless in writing 
signed by the party to be charged with the same. Accordingly, no 
waiver or amendment shall be implied by course of conduct or by 
action or inaction of any party hereto. In the event that any 
party hereunder shall find it necessary to take action (judicial 
or otherwise) for the enforcement of the provisions of this 
Agreement, such party shall be entitled to payment by the 
nonprevailing party of costs of court and all expenses, including 
reasonable attorneys* fees, incurred in connection with any such 
action. This Agreement is binding upon the heirs, successors and 
assigns of the parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties cause this Agreement to be 
executed upon the date and day first set forth hereinabove. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
National Association 
By: 
Its: 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC. 
By: 
Its: 
Lowell N. Jensen, individually 
Barbara W. Jensen, individually 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• gg
 # 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me of Zions First National 
Bank, known by me to be a signer of the foregoing Mutual Release 
and Waiver Agreement who duly acknowledged to me that he has read 
the foregoing Mutual Release and Waiver Agreement, knows and 
understands its contents, and voluntarily signed the same on 
behalf of and with authority from Zions First National Bank. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me of Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc., known by me to be a signer of the foregoing 
Mutual Release and Waiver Agreement who duly acknowledged to me 
that (s)he has read the foregoing Mutual Release and Waiver 
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Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and voluntarily 
signed the same on behalf of and with authority from Barbara 
Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Lowell N. Jensen, known by me to be a signer of the 
foregoing Mutual Release and Waiver Agreement who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Mutual Release 
and Waiver Agreement, knows and understands its contents and 
voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Barbara W. Jensen, known by me to be a signer of the 
foregoing Mutual Release and Waiver Agreement who duly 
acknowledged to me that she has read the foregoing Mutual Release 
and Waiver Agreement, knows and understands its contents and 
voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
1073A 
-6-
Exhibit "A" 
Promissory Note in the amount of $61,600 dated May 31, 1985 
executed by Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
Continuing Guarantee of Credit dated July 1984 in the amount of 
$250,000 executed by Lowell N. Jensen. 
Continuing Guarantee of Credit dated July 1984 in the amount of 
$250,000 executed by Barbara W. Jensen. 
CHARLES C. BROWN (A1446) and 
JEFFREY B. BROWN (A0457) of 
BROWN & BROWN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-5656 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : 
a national association, JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION 
: AND VERFIED STATEMENT 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, Civil No. C-86-4044 
INC. and LOWELL N. JENSEN : 
and BARBARA W. JENSEN, Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Defendants Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., Lowell N. 
Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen, by and through their counsel of 
record, Jeffrey B. Brown.of Brown & Brown, P.C, pursuant to Rule 
58A(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Annot. 
§ 78-22-3, submit the following Judgment by Confession and 
Verified Statement which are agreed to by each of the foregoing 
Defendants. 
We, Lowell N. Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen, both in our 
individual capacities and as officers of Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc., having been duly sworn, state and depose as follows: 
1. We are residents of the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Zions First National Bank, a national 
association, has asserted a claim against Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc. on a May 31, 1985 Promissory Note in the principal 
amount of $61,600.00 together with interest thereon from May 31, 
1985 at the rate of base rate plus 3%, which as of this date 
amounts to $ . Zions First National Bank also has 
asserted claims against Lowell N. Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen on 
separate forms of a Continuing Guarantee dated in July, 1984 to 
guarantee payment of overdrafts of Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
These claims arise from the failure of Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc. to pay overdrafts which resulted in execution of said 
Promissory Note by Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. and the 
guaranteeing of payment for said Promissory Note by Lowell N. 
Jensen and Barbara W. Jensen. 
3. The claims asserted against Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc. and us in our individual capacities by Zions First National 
Bank are-justly due. 
4. Therefore, we in both our individual and corporate 
capacities, authorize that judgment be entered against us in the 
sum of $ (which includes $61,600.00 in principal 
and $ in interest as of this date) with interest 
accruing hereafter at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. 
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DATED this day of February, 1987. 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC, 
By:. 
Barbara W. Jensen 
Its; 
BARBARA JENSEN INTERIORS, INC, 
By*\ 
Lowell N. Jensen 
Its: 
Barbara W, Jensen, Individually 
Lowell ft. Jensen, Individually 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Lowell N. Jensen of Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. known 
by me to be a signer of the foregoing Judgment by Confession and 
Verified Statement who duly acknowledged to me that he has read 
the foregoing Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement, knows 
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and understands its contents, and voluntarily signed the same on 
behalf of and with authority from Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Barbara W. Jensen of Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. 
known by me to be a signer of the foregoing Judgment by Confession 
and Verified Statement who duly acknowledged to me that she has 
read the foregoing Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement, 
knows and understands its contents, and voluntarily signed the 
same on behalf of and with authority from Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Lowell N. Jensen known by me to be a signer of the 
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foregoing Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement who duly 
acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Judgment by 
Confession and Verified Statement, knows and understands its 
contents and voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
30UNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of February, 1987 personally appeared 
before me Barbara W. Jensen known by me to be a signer of the 
foregoing Judgment by Confession and Verified Statement who duly 
acknowledged to me that she has read the foregoing Judgment by 
Confession and Verified Statement, knows and understands its 
contents and voluntarily signed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
1074A 
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